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The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: “Representatives shall be apportioned 
among the several states according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each state . . . . [T]he basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the 
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.”1 This portion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, combined with the Equal Protection Clause, 
has resulted in the “one-person, one-vote” rule.2 This rule promises 
substantial equality of population within any of a state’s voting 
districts.3 Federal courts have largely granted the states great 
deference in choosing a measure of population that provides the most 
equal voting districts.4 Historically, most states have used total 
population to satisfy “one-person, one-vote,” but particular 
circumstances have warranted use of state citizenship and voter 
registration to achieve the most equitable apportionments.5 
Despite the Supreme Court’s previous reticence to define which 
population bases are acceptable for state districting, a recent dispute 
now before the Court gives it an opportunity to settle once and for all 
the nuances and boundaries of the Court’s previous demands for 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 2.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 5.  See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). 
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“substantial equality” in districting.6 This Commentary will explore 
Evenwel v. Abbott,7 a case in which the Supreme Court has an 
opportunity to synthesize the “one-person, one-vote” doctrine. The 
Court will rule on the constitutionality of Texas’s total population 
districting plan and whether it must be replaced with a plan that 
better distributes registered voters across the state.8 Part I presents 
the factual and procedural background to Evenwel. Part II details the 
history of “one-person, one-vote” doctrine under the Equal 
Protection Clause and provides a snapshot of current controlling 
precedent. Part III briefly outlines the Western District of Texas’s 
holding9 before Part IV discusses the arguments raised by the parties. 
Finally, Part V argues that the Supreme Court should uphold Texas’s 
total population apportionment or else risk frustrating a large portion 
of controlling Equal Protection doctrine. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 17, 2011, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law a 
reapportionment plan for state senatorial districts.10 That 
reapportionment scheme, Plan S148, was eventually challenged in 
federal district court and struck down11 for violating the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (VRA).12 The District Court for the Western District of 
Texas required implementation of a new plan ahead of the 2012 state 
senate elections because Plan S148 failed to achieve preclearance13 
from the District Court for the District of Columbia.14 That court then 
implemented Plan S172 for the 2012 state senate elections.15 
 
 6.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. 
 7.  135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015). 
 8.  See id. 
 9.  Because this is a case under the Voting Rights Act, the case was heard by a three-judge 
panel of the District Court in the Western District of Texas. The case was directly appealed 
from the district court to the Supreme Court. 
 10.  Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014), prob. juris. noted 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.) (VRA). 
 13.  Section 5 of the VRA requires all states who previously used unconstitutional voting 
tests to ex ante seek and be granted declaratory judgments validating the legality of any voting-
related legislation. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012). See also id. § 10303. Texas is subject to this 
requirement and failed to achieve such preclearance for Plan S148. 
 14.  Davis v. Perry, 991 F. Supp. 2d 809, 816 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
 15.  Id. at 817. 
HERMAN FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2016  3:45 PM 
2016] DISTRICTLY SPEAKING: THE APPORTIONMENT POPULATION DEBATE 211 
Plan S172 was formulated with the help of the Texas Legislative 
Council, a nonpartisan entity tasked with compiling all relevant data 
for redistricting efforts.16 The Texas Legislative Council provided the 
state legislature with Census and American Community Survey data 
relevant to total population, voting age population (VAP), and citizen 
voting age population (CVAP).17 Ultimately, Plan S172 divided Texas 
into thirty-one districts of equal total population.18 The average 
deviation for each district from the ideal total population was 8.04%.19 
On June 21, 2012, the Texas legislature and Governor Perry signed 
Plan S172 into law as the “official Texas Senate districting plan.”20 
On April 21, 2014, Texas citizens Sue Evenwel and Edward 
Pfenniger filed an action against Governor Perry and Texas Secretary 
of State Nandita Berry in their official capacities.21 Evenwel and 
Pfenniger alleged that the implementation of Plan S172 violated their 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the “one-person, one-vote” requirement.22 Both 
Evenwel and Pfenniger identify as registered voters who “regularly 
vote[] in Texas Senate elections and plan[] to do so in the future.”23 In 
their complaint, Evenwel and Pfenniger claimed that their districts 
were “among the most overpopulated with eligible voters.”24 Evenwel 
and Pfenniger alleged that apportioning districts by equalizing total 
population unconstitutionally dilutes their voting power and violates 
“one-person, one-vote.”25 Specifically, they claim that total population 
equalization renders their votes between 1.41 and 1.84 times less 
powerful than voters in other districts.26 
 
 16.  See generally TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DATA FOR 2011 REDISTRICTING IN 
TEXAS (Feb. 2011), http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/pdf/Data_2011_Redistricting.pdf. 
 17.  See id.; see also TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL Data for 2011 REDISTRICTING IN 
TEXAS—ADDENDUM ON CITIZENSHIP DATA (Feb 2011), http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/ 
pdf/CitizenshipAddendum.pdf. 
 18.  Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). 
 19.  See id. (referencing that, for purposes of state apportionment, ideal total population of 
a district is calculated by dividing the state’s total population by the total number of state senate 
districts). 
 20.  Davis v. Perry, 991 F. Supp. 2d 809, 817 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
 21.  Evenwel, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Brief for Appellants at 10, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. July 31, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 11–12. 
 26.  Id. 
HERMAN FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2016  3:45 PM 
212 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
Evenwel and Pfenniger moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that Texas violated the Fourteenth Amendment by neglecting to 
apportion state senate districts without considering some form of 
voter population.27 Concurrently, Texas filed a motion to dismiss 
claiming that “there was no legal basis for Plaintiff’s claim that Plan 
S172 is unconstitutional for not apportioning districts pursuant to 
Plaintiff’s proffered scheme.”28 A three-judge panel on the District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted the Defendants’ 
motion and dismissed Evenwel and Pfenniger’s claims with 
prejudice.29 An appeal of the district court’s decision followed, and the 
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on May 26, 2015.30 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Justiciability of State-Level Districting Schemes 
The United States Constitution protects all qualified voters’ right 
to vote.31 Moreover, all such voters have the constitutionally protected 
right to have their votes counted.32 Despite these pronouncements, the 
Supreme Court did not recognize the federal judiciary’s ability to rule 
on allegations of vote “debasement or dilution” until 1962.33 That year, 
the Supreme Court declared that claims of vote dilution arising out of 
a state’s districting scheme for in-state elections were federally 
justiciable.34 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court declared that cases 
of state-level vote dilution should not be subject to ad hoc policy 
formulations of local courts, but instead fall within the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.35 A court’s task in 
such a case is to “determine, if . . . a discrimination reflects no policy, 
but [rather] simply arbitrary and capricious action.”36 Since Baker, the 
Supreme Court has consistently used the “judicially manageable 
 
 27.  Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Evenwel, 2014 WL 5780507, at *4. 
 30.  See Evenwel v. Abbott, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015). 
 31.  Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
 32.  United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1933). 
 33.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 34.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 35.  Id. at 226. 
 36.  Id. 
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standards” of the Equal Protection Clause to analyze districting and 
reapportionment disputes.37 
B.  “One-Person, One-Vote” 
After Baker held that courts could review state-level districting 
schemes, the Court provided very little guidance as to the exact 
standards state legislatures should follow.38 Subsequently, in Gray v. 
Sanders, the Court offered some guidance by demanding that all 
participants in state elections have “an equal vote—whatever their 
race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their 
income, wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.”39 In 
Gray, the Court faced the question of the constitutionality of 
Georgia’s county unit system,40 by which an entire county’s votes 
would be awarded to the candidate that carried the majority in that 
particular county.41 The Court concluded that the system was 
unconstitutional because it rendered an entire class of votes valueless 
if they were not cast for the candidate that carried the majority in 
their county.42 
Gray was the first decision in which the Court required voting 
equality to reflect “[t]he conception of political equality . . . [as] 
mean[ing] one thing—one person, one vote.”43 Although the Court 
emphatically articulated the notion of “one-person, one-vote,” it 
would subsequently issue a caveat recognizing the incompatibility of 
state and federal-level districting analyses.44 Thus, in its next state 
districting case, the Supreme Court articulated its “judicial focus” as 
necessarily a fact-specific inquiry into “whether there has been any 
discrimination . . . which constitutes an impermissible impairment” on 
the right to vote.45 
 
 37.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 557 (1964). 
 38.  Id. at 556. 
 39.  Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963). 
 40.  The county unit system is properly analogized as a state-level implementation of the 
Electoral College system for federal Presidential elections.  
 41.  See generally Gray, 372 U.S. 368. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 381. 
 44.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (holding that “the federal analogy [is] 
inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes”). 
 45.  Id. at 561. 
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C.  “One-Person, One-Vote” in Reynolds v. Sims 
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that “the Equal 
Protection Clause requires both houses of a state legislature to be 
apportioned on a population basis.”46 Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Warren Burger advocated a nuanced balancing of existing 
districting precedent and ordinary notions of equality.47 While the 
Court took notice of states’ need to “rationally consider factors other 
than population in apportioning legislative representation,” it held 
that the “domain of state interest” must never be used as an 
“instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.”48 In other 
words, the Court would never tolerate anything less than “an honest 
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its 
legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”49 The 
Court did, however, admit the “practical impossibility [of arranging] 
legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of 
residents, or citizens, or voters.”50 
The Supreme Court also took notice of the impracticability of 
holding all state legislatures to the same standard.51 The Court 
clarified that each state’s “overriding objective must be substantial 
equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of 
any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other 
citizen in the State.”52 Chief Justice Burger reasoned that “[s]o long as 
the divergences from a strict population standard are based on 
legitimate considerations,” the Constitution allows states to 
accomplish substantial equality by “whatever” means.53 Finally, the 
Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require such 
reapportionment to occur every ten years after the release of the 
decennial census population statistics.54 
 
 46.  Id. at 576. 
 47.  Id. at 561 (framing the question presented as the need to “ascertain, in the instant 
cases, whether there are any constitutionally cognizable principles which would justify 
departures from the basic standard of equality among voters in the apportionment of seats in 
state legislatures”). 
 48.  Id. at 566 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)). 
 49.  Id. at 577. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 578 (“[W]hat is marginally permissible in one State may be unsatisfactory in 
another, depending on the particular circumstances of the case.”). 
 52.  Id. at 579. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 583 (reasoning that decennial reapportionment “appears to be a rational 
approach to readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account population 
shifts and growth”). 
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D.  Burns and the First True Test of Reynolds’s “Substantial Equality” 
The Court used Reynolds’s “substantial equality” analysis to 
determine the constitutionality of a Hawaii districting scheme 
designed to remedy large variations in total population and voting 
registration.55 In Burns v. Richardson, the Hawaiian State Legislature 
adopted a districting plan based on voting registration statistics after a 
district court ordered that the state’s pre-existing geography-based 
districting scheme be abandoned.56 Hawaii used voting registration 
figures to allay fears that a total population regime would bestow an 
unfair advantage upon the district of Oahu.57 Oahu was heavily 
populated with unregistered military personnel and tourists, which 
resulted in a six percent disparity between total population (79% of 
Hawaii’s total population) and voter registration (73% of registered 
voters in Hawaii).58 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the voting registration 
scheme by restating the comprehensive analysis mandated by 
Reynolds and reinforcing the importance of measured judicial 
deference.59 The Court declared that review must “consider the 
scheme as a whole” so as to allow “the body creating an 
apportionment plan in compliance with a judicial order [to be] left 
free to devise proposals for apportionment on an overall basis.”60 The 
Court expanded upon Reynolds’s “substantial equality” standard by 
declaring that “a State’s freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an 
apportionment plan found unconstitutional either as a whole or in 
part, should not be restricted beyond the clear commands of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”61 
Of paramount importance in Burns was Equal Protection Clause 
precedent that had established safeguards against “invidious 
discrimination.”62 Districting schemes violate the prohibition on 
invidious discrimination “only if it can be shown that designedly or 
otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme . . . 
would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial 
 
 55.  See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91–92 (1966). 
 56.  Id. at 77. 
 57.  Id. at 90. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 83. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 85. 
 62.  Id. at 88–89. 
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or political elements of the voting population.”63 The plaintiff has the 
burden to offer “evidence in the record,” rather than mere 
speculation, to prove that “districting was designed to have or had the 
invidious effect necessary.”64 Without evidence of such invidiousness, 
“[t]he decision to include or exclude any such group involves choices 
about the nature of the representation with which [the Supreme 
Court has] been shown no constitutionally founded reason to 
interfere.”65 
The Court acknowledged that Reynolds analyzed a total 
population regime, but “the Equal Protection Clause does not require 
the States to use” total population instead of voter or citizen 
population.66 Rather, the Court merely surmised that total population 
was typically the most stable metric for accomplishing voting 
equality.67 To this end, the Court identified “an additional problem” 
associated with districting regimes that rely on “a registered voter or 
actual voter basis.”68 Not only are voter-based metrics subject to 
quirks of a state’s own citizenship criteria, but they are also heavily 
influenced by volatile trends in political activity.69 Considering the 
Reynolds requirement that states redistrict every ten years, voting-
based metrics have the potential to differ greatly each year depending 
on the existence of controversial election issues, on highly popular 
candidates, or even on unusual weather.70 
As a result, the Court cautiously held that the registered voter 
basis for reapportionment satisfied the Equal Protection Clause on 
these specific facts because “it was found to have produced a 
distribution of legislators not substantially different from that which 
would have resulted from the use of a permissible population basis.”71 
 
 63.  Id. at 88 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). See also Pers. Adm’r of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (holding that the Equal Protection clause and its 
prohibition on invidious discrimination requires evidence of a discriminatory purpose that belies 
selection or reaffirmation of “a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). 
 64.  Burns, 384 U.S. at 88. 
 65.  Id. at 92. 
 66.  Id. at 91. 
 67.  See id. at 92–93. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. (remarking that registered voter and actual voter measurements are “susceptible to 
improper influences by which those in political power might be able to perpetuate 
underrepresentation of groups constitutionally entitled to participate in the electoral process”). 
 70.  Id. at 93 (quoting Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 352 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 
1965)). 
 71.  Id. 
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Voter registration was permissible solely because it “was chosen as a 
reasonable approximation of both citizen and total population.”72 
Ultimately, the Court concluded its opinion by clarifying that Burns 
must not “be understood as deciding that the validity of the registered 
voters basis as a measure has been established for all time or 
circumstances.”73 
E.  Current “One-Person, One-Vote” Doctrine for State Districting 
Reynolds and Burns may be the most prominent “one-person, 
one-vote” cases, but other federal decisions inform the Supreme 
Court’s current standards for apportionment equality.74 In the 1973 
case Mahan v. Howell,75 the Court emphatically foreclosed any 
applicability of federal apportionment equality tests to state-level 
districting schemes. Later, in Gaffney v. Cummings,76 the Supreme 
Court substantiated the state-federal distinction when it upheld a 
Connecticut scheme by using Reynolds doctrine as applied in Burns 
rather than the “more stringent standards” applied to federal 
districting disputes.77 
In state-level districting cases, not all deviations from perfect 
population equality make out prima facie equal protection 
violations.78 Instead, judicial intervention is reserved for cases of 
substantial vote dilution to keep the task of reapportionment within 
the realm of state legislatures.79 Not only was the Court concerned 
about “making the standards of reapportionment so difficult to satisfy 
that the reapportionment task is recurringly [sic] removed from 
legislative hands” but it also addressed the possibility that such high 
standards would allow “plaintiffs who may have wholly different goals 
from those embodied in the official plan” to abuse the fact that equal 
protection challenges could be brought with ease.80 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 96. 
 74.  See Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *2–4 
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). 
 75.  410 U.S. 315 (1973). 
 76.  412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 77.  See id. at 741 (alluding to both Mahan and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 
(1969), where the Court held that “one-man, one-vote” for federal apportionment requires that 
population variances be unavoidable despite a good faith effort to cure them). 
 78.  Id. at 743. 
 79.  Id. at 749. 
 80.  Id. 
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In Brown v. Thomson,81 the Supreme Court solidified its objective 
test for determining which population equality deviations established 
prima facie cases for equal protection violations and thus warranted 
adequate justification by state governments.82 Ideal population of a 
district is to be calculated by dividing the state’s total population by 
the total number of state senate districts.83 The Court determined that 
any deviation less than ten percent from the ideal population for a 
given district would be considered “minor.”84 
Following Thomson, two notable cases in the Ninth and Fifth 
Circuits provided additional perspectives for analyzing violations of 
the Equal Protection Clause’s “one-person, one-vote” rule.85 In Garza 
v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Reynolds and 
its progeny to require use of total population equality among 
districts.86 Garza is also notable for Justice Alex Kozinski’s vehement 
dissent against the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
representational (population-based) rather than electoral (voting-
based) equality.87 Justice Kozinski reasoned that although the choice 
to use total population is usually not problematic, voting registration 
metrics must be used when there is any imbalance of voting power.88 
Ten years later, the Fifth Circuit ruled on Chen v. City of Houston, 
which posed similar questions of vote dilution. Unlike the Ninth 
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Chen interpreted Reynolds and its progeny 
to allow for districting that provided for representational and 
electoral equality so long as there was a good faith effort to avoid 
substantial vote dilution.89 The Chen court reasoned that a decision to 
require use of a citizenship-based metric such as CVAP might 
foreclose the opportunity (which is not prohibited in the 
Constitution) for state legislatures to exercise their right to extend the 
right to vote to aliens.90 
 
 81.  462 U.S. 835 (1983). 
 82.  See id. at 852 (describing the Court’s test). 
 83.  Id. at 842. 
 84.  Id. at 842–43; see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977). 
 85.  Chen v. City of Hous., 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000); Garza v. Cty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
 86.  918 F.2d at 774 (discussing the need for individuals in more populous areas to have 
equal access to their state government). 
 87.  See generally id. at 778–88 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 88.  Id. at 780–81. 
 89.  Chen, 206 F.3d at 524. 
 90.  Id. at 523. 
HERMAN FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2016  3:45 PM 
2016] DISTRICTLY SPEAKING: THE APPORTIONMENT POPULATION DEBATE 219 
III.  HOLDING 
The Western District of Texas dismissed Evenwel and Pfenniger’s 
suit, finding that they failed to state a claim that Plan S172 violated 
the Equal Protection Clause’s “one-person, one-vote” rule.91 The court 
confined its analysis to the issue of whether the plan achieved 
“substantial equality of population among districts when measured 
using a permissible population base.”92 Because Evenwel and 
Pfenniger chose not to allege “the apportionment base employed by 
Texas involves a choice the Constitution forbids,” the court held that 
it lacked the authority to invalidate Plan S172 on the grounds that “it 
does not achieve equality as measured by [Evenwel and Pfenniger’s] 
chosen metric.”93 The court reasoned that such a theory had “never 
before [been] accepted by the Supreme Court or any circuit court.”94 
The relevant constitutional principle was framed as “whether to 
include or exclude groups of individuals ineligible to vote from an 
apportionment base.”95 Consequently, the court read Burns v. 
Richardson to require deference to the choices made by the state 
legislature in the absence of a constitutionally forbidden act of 
discrimination.96 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Arguments of Evenwel and Pfenniger 
Appellants Evenwel and Pfenniger frame their argument by 
asking “whether the one-person, one-vote principle of the Fourteenth 
Amendment creates a judicially enforceable right ensuring that the 
districting process does not deny voters an equal vote.”97 Evenwel and 
Pfenniger argue that the lower court’s ruling is entirely irreconcilable 
with a determination that “one-person, one-vote” protects the right of 
individuals to have an equal vote.98 If the Supreme Court does not 
find that Plan S172 violates this principle, it is argued that “the Texas 
Legislature could have adopted a Senate map containing 31 districts 
 
 91.  Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *4 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). 
 92.  Id. at *2. 
 93.  Id. at *2–3. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at *4 (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966)). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at i. 
 98.  Id. at 3. 
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of equal total population without violating the one-person, one-vote 
rule—even if 30 of the districts each contained one eligible voter and 
the 31st district contained every other eligible voter.”99 
Evenwel and Pfenniger argue that the districts created by Plan 
S172, “while roughly equal in terms of total population, were grossly 
malapportioned in terms of eligible voters.”100 They provided figures 
that show that if CVAP, Total Voter Registration, and Non-Suspense 
Voter Registration (total registration minus voters who failed to 
respond to a confirmation of residence notice) are used, Plan S172 
produces districts that deviate from the ideal district101 by a value of 
between 45.95% and 55.06%.102 As a result, Evenwel and Pfenniger 
allege that their votes have been diluted compared to the average 
citizen by a factor of between 1.41 and 1.84.103 
Drawing heavily from Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, 
Evenwel and Pfenniger fear that an affirmation of the lower court’s 
holding will result in “the choice of a population base [being] 
unreviewable no matter how much vote dilution it causes.”104 In 
general, they do not oppose the choice to use total population as a 
basis for reapportionment, but when eligible voters are not given 
equal voting power “demographic data that ensures the vote of any 
citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in 
the State must be used.”105 Accordingly, Evenwel and Pfenniger 
adamantly oppose the lower court’s decision to give deference to the 
Texas legislature.106 While the legislature should be afforded the 
ability to consider factors such as integrity of political subdivisions, 
political compactness, and even representational equality (ability of 
non-voters to access government), Evenwel and Pfenniger maintain 
that population of eligible voters must be given controlling 
consideration.107 It follows that Evenwel and Pfenniger allege that the 
lower court’s refusal to overturn Plan S172 reflects a failure to 
 
 99.  Id. at 2–3. 
 100.  Id. at 8. 
 101.  See supra note 19 (explaining how deviation from the ideal is calculated). 
 102.  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 9. 
 103.  Id. at 11–12. 
 104.  See id. at 14; see discussion supra Section II.A. 
 105.  Id. at 15 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)). 
 106.  See id at 14; see discussion supra Section II.A. 
 107.  Id. at 18. 
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address a plainly justiciable constitutional claim under Baker and 
Reynolds.108 
Evenwel and Pfenniger also oppose the lower court’s 
interpretation of Burns v. Richards.109 Unlike the lower court, Evenwel 
and Pfenniger believe that Burns advocates for use of an alternative 
population base even if total district populations do not deviate by 
more than the required ten percent.110 In other words, Evenwel and 
Pfenniger argue that every districting review must account for 
population deviations when measured using CVAP and other 
registered voter bases.111 Thus, even if the average total population 
deviation from ideal is below ten percent, deviations resulting from 
voting-based metrics that exceed that threshold are per se 
unconstitutional and illustrative of the absence of good faith.112 
Evenwel and Pfenniger recognize that Burns allowed the use of a 
registered voter base for reapportionment only because it 
substantially mimicked what the outcome would have been if a 
citizenship-based metric were used.113 Nevertheless, they draw on 
Chen v. City of Houston and Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Garza v. 
County of Los Angeles to illustrate the context in which the current 
case arises.114 Just as the circumstances in Burns warranted 
apportionment according to registered voters, the Supreme Court is 
urged to accept that “eligible voters will frequently track the total 
population evenly.”115 Mandating that Texas redraw districts according 
to CVAP, total voter registration, or non-suspense voter registration 
ensures that “the Court’s primary concern [of] equalizing the voting 
power of electors” is fulfilled.116 
Evenwel and Pfenniger urge the Supreme Court to fashion a 
decision recognizing that “requiring the States to apportion 
approximately the same number of eligible voters to each district is 
the only way to enforce that constitutional right.”117 Extending the 
 
 108.  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 19. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 109.  Id. at 15–17. See also id. at 32–37. 
 110.  Id. at 16. 
 111.  Id. at 34–37. 
 112.  Id. at 18. 
 113.  Id. at 27–28. 
 114.  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 27–28. 
 115.  Id. at 28 (quoting Chen v. City of Hous., 206 F.3d 502, 525 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
 116.  Id. at 27 (quoting Garza v. Cty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 782 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 117.  Id. at 19. 
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judiciary’s lens through which it seeks out gross deviations that 
violate “one-person, one-vote” is the only way to ensure “some outer 
limit to the magnitude of the deviation that is constitutionally 
permissible even in the face of the strongest justifications.”118 Allowing 
Plan S172 to continue as the current redistricting plan would ensure 
that Texas would be rewarded for giving “no consideration to voter 
equality.”119 
B.  Arguments of Texas 
Texas frames its argument by asking “whether the three-judge 
district court correctly held that the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle 
under the Equal Protection Clause allows states to use total 
population, and does not require states to use voter population, when 
apportioning state legislative districts.”120 Texas views any challenge to 
Plan S172 as necessarily one of invidious vote discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause.121 Evenwel and Pfenniger must therefore 
prove that Plan S172 resulted from a lack of a good faith effort to 
equalize districts according to population.122 Consequently, a failure to 
prove irrationality or a purpose of diluting votes must result in an 
affirmation of the lower court.123 
Citing Reynolds v. Sims and Brown v. Thomson, Texas first 
establishes that any challenge to a districting scheme on “one-person, 
one-vote” grounds is a justiciable claim so long as the complaining 
party provides the required proof of invidiousness.124 Texas contends 
that invidiousness must be understood in terms of Equal Protection 
precedent that recognizes certain state action will inevitably affect 
some individuals differently than others.125 Therefore, invidiousness 
only exists when the difference in treatment is the result of a decision-
maker seeking out the particular outcome to achieve adverse effects 
for an identifiable group.126 Texas adamantly contends that Evenwel 
 
 118.  Id. at 49 (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 849–850 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 119.  Id. at 50. 
 120.  Brief for Appellees at (i), Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. Sept. 18, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brief for Appellees]. 
 121.  Id. at 10. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 1–2. 
 124.  Id. at 10–11. 
 125.  Id. at 16–17. 
 126.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 16–17 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
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and Pfenniger have failed to allege with specificity any such intention 
on behalf of the State.127 
Next, Texas contends that a showing of a good faith effort to 
equalize total, citizen, or voting-eligible populations can effectively 
rebut any claimed invidiousness.128 Texas uses Burns to support the 
proposition that the judiciary has historically been hesitant to 
interfere with legislative decisions regarding reapportionment of state 
voting districts.129 Given the abundance of policy outcomes states must 
consider when redrawing districts, the courts have accepted use of 
both total population or citizen population so long as arbitrariness, 
irrationality, or invidiousness are not present.130 Furthermore, Texas 
contends that the Supreme Court’s allowance for voting population in 
Burns does not “cast[] doubt on the validity of total population as a 
permissible apportionment base.”131 Rather, the Court in Burns 
accepted voter population solely on the grounds that it substantially 
mimicked the effect of an otherwise permissible population base 
(such as total or citizen population).132 Texas suggests that the decision 
to use total population rather than voter registration statistics was 
entirely rational considering the “additional problem” of political 
volatility.133 
Texas also argues that Plan S172’s use of total population does not 
substantially dilute the votes of its citizens and therefore does not 
require a complete change in the “one-person, one-vote” rule.134 First, 
Texas places Plan S172 in the context of the ten percent rule for total 
population deviations from the ideal district.135 It is submitted that 
requiring use of alternative bases for apportionment whenever non-
total population deviations exceed ten percent would be both 
practically and substantively wrong.136 Texas posits that “[s]tates 
typically apportion their legislative seats based on total population,” 
to the extent that “line-drawers across the nation rely almost 
uniformly on total population.”137 Here, Plan S172’s average deviation 
 
 127.  Id. at 17–18. 
 128.  Id. at 18; see discussion supra Part II. 
 129.  Id. at 21–23. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 23. 
 132.  Id. at 22–23. 
 133.  Id. at 22. 
 134.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 135.  Id. at 26–28. 
 136.  See id. at 28–31. 
 137.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 28 (quoting J. Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 
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from ideal voting districts based on total population is only 8.04%, a 
figure similar to the one that the Supreme Court summarily declared 
insubstantial in Gaffney v. Cummings.138 Additionally, Texas points to a 
non-exhaustive list of fourteen Supreme Court decisions as evidence 
that total population, and its accompanying ten percent deviation test, 
has been the controlling “one-person, one-vote” metric since the 
Court first examined the issue.139 
Texas argues that the importance of total population equality 
results in the principle “that [s]tates cannot subordinate population 
equality to other concerns when apportioning.”140 Historically 
speaking, “if a [s]tate creates districts of substantially equal 
population, it has generally satisfied the Equal Protection Clause and 
cannot be charged with invidious vote dilution.”141 Texas interprets 
Reynolds to accept good faith efforts to reapportion based on total 
population, citizen population, or voter population.142 Texas suggests 
that a Supreme Court decision to strike down Plan S172 would break 
from overwhelming Supreme Court precedent that has never 
considered a good faith effort to equalize total population as 
constitutionally infirm.143 Texas even maintains that while total 
population equality is not a constitutional requirement, the history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the Framers of that 
Amendment favored it over strict electoral equality.144 Thus, while 
Texas is careful to agree that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Garza 
mandating total population equality is not doctrinally correct, it 
correctly supports the notion that the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment at least accepted that representational equality was a 
major factor in state districting decisions.145 
Finally Texas directly attacks the apportionment methods 
Evenwel and Pfenniger urge the Supreme Court to support.146 Texas 
 
YALE L.J. 1888, 1890 (2012)). See also id. at 1a–46a (displaying the statutes for the majority of 
states that use total population to reapportion their districts every ten years). 
 138.  Id. at 26–27. 
 139.  Id. at 29–31. 
 140.  Id. at 34. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 38. 
 143.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 38–39. 
 144.  Id. at 40–41 (referencing the Fifth Circuit’s discussion in Chen of evidence suggesting 
that a proposed draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that required electoral equality was 
rejected by the Framers, 206 F.3d at 527). 
 145.  Id. at 41–42. 
 146.  Id. at 55–57. 
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argues that, insofar as Evenwel and Pfenniger suggest abandonment 
of total population, their suggested alternatives are too varied to 
warrant a Supreme Court order mandating use of CVAP, voter 
registration, or non-suspense voter registration.147 The range of voting 
strength deviations according to CVAP, voter registration, and non-
suspense voter registration is itself ten percent.148 This constitutionally 
significant discrepancy should in and of itself be enough to trigger 
judicial suspicion.149 In any event, Texas maintains that there is a 
dearth of evidence regarding any lack of a good faith effort behind 
the implementation of Plan S172.150 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Evenwel v. Abbott presents the Supreme Court’s first opportunity 
to define exactly what type of population equality the Equal 
Protection Clause requires states to use for districting and to 
determine whether the Court’s historically deferential rulings are still 
good law. Despite the superficially convincing statistical arguments 
provided by Evenwel and Pfenniger, their constitutional claim must 
fail. The Equal Protection Clause requires a successful “one-person, 
one-vote” claim to be accompanied by evidence that either proves an 
invidious intent to dilute votes or undermines the notion of a state 
government’s good faith effort to equalize voting power. Evenwel and 
Pfenniger have failed to provide either. Additionally, mandating the 
use of the voting statistics proffered by Evenwel and Pfenniger will 
result in the type of arbitrary administration the Equal Protection 
Clause is supposed to protect against. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court should affirm the lower court’s ruling and uphold Plan S172 as 
satisfactory under the “one-person, one-vote” doctrine. A contrary 
ruling would defy established Equal Protection Clause doctrine and 
leave the important issue of state reapportionment in uncharted 
judicial waters. 
A.  Evenwel and Pfenniger Do Not Provide Sufficient Evidence To 
Prove a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
First, Evenwel and Pfenniger summarily fail to assert that Texas 
purposely singled out a particular, identifiable group of individuals for 
 
 147.  Id. at 55. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 55–56. 
 150.  Id. at 56–57. 
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vote dilution. Instead, they merely claim that their particular voting 
districts had been treated differently than other districts when 
analyzed using three voting-based metrics.151 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has previously only accepted one of the voting-based 
frameworks through which Evenwel and Pfenniger advance their 
argument, and on an extremely limited basis.152 Even if each of the 
three voting-based metrics volunteered by Evenwel and Pfenniger 
were constitutionally permissible, the Equal Protection Clause only 
protects against purposeful discrimination.153 There is simply no 
evidence that Texas purposefully chose to apportion its districts in a 
manner that diluted the votes of Evenwel and Pfenniger’s respective 
districts. 
Evenwel and Pfenniger also argue that Plan S172 must be 
invalidated because it could hypothetically allow the Texas 
Legislature to adopt “a Senate map containing 31 districts of equal 
total population without violating the one-person, one-vote rule––
even if 30 of the districts each contained one eligible voter and the 
31st district contained every other eligible voter in the State.”154 This 
argument fails because it is exactly the type of speculative evidence 
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Burns.155 Furthermore, this 
reasoning is troublesome because it disregards the second portion of 
the “one-person, one-vote” Equal Protection test that requires a good 
faith effort to equalize a permissible population base.156 
Just as Evenwel and Pfenniger have failed to satisfactorily allege 
an invidious purpose behind Plan S172, they have failed to provide 
substantial evidence to undermine Texas’s assertion that the plan 
represents an honest and good faith effort to create fair districts. 
Aside from the evidence illustrating Plan S172’s deviations from the 
ideal in terms of their hand-picked voting-based metrics, the only 
other attempt to undermine the good faith behind Plan S172 is a set 
of conclusory statements regarding the capability to create more 
 
 151.  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 11–12. 
 152.  Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 93 (1966) (declaring that use of registered voters for 
Hawaii’s apportionment plan satisfies the Equal Protection Clause “only because on this record 
it was found to have produced a distribution of legislators not substantially different from that 
which would have resulted from the use of a permissible population basis”). 
 153.  See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 154.  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
 155.  384 U.S. at 88–89 (“Speculations do not supply evidence that the multi-member 
districting was designed to have or had the invidious effect necessary to a judgment of the 
unconstitutionality of the districting.”). 
 156.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 
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equal districts.157 According to Evenwel and Pfenniger, there are 
“many feasible ways” to “minimize” both total population deviations 
and CVAP deviations.158 Unfortunately, the actual figures of these 
alternate plans were not presented to the legislature nor were they 
appended to Evenwel and Pfenniger’s brief.159 Instead, these 
conclusory statements were provided in the form of a demographer’s 
two-page sworn statement.160 Without proof of invidious dilution or 
substantial evidence undermining the good faith of the state 
legislature, the 8.04% average deviation from ideal total population of 
Plan S172 must be understood as constitutionally minor and 
consonant with the Equal Protection Clause.161 
B.  Requiring Reapportionment Based on Voting-Based Statistics May 
Result in Arbitrary, Irrational Administration of the “One-Person, 
One-Vote” Principle. 
If the Supreme Court were to rule in favor of Evenwel and 
Pfenniger and require states to “apportion approximately the same 
number of eligible voters to each district,”162 the Court would 
necessarily rely on a body of statistical evidence that is both volatile 
and difficult to ascertain.163 The Supreme Court has recognized the 
difficult problems posed by voter-based reapportionment and has 
even characterized state voter registration policies as a threat to 
perpetuate the “ghost of malapportionment.”164 For the Supreme 
Court to order every state to apportion its districts according to voter 
registration statistics would be to put electoral equality at the mercy 
of “fortuitous factors as a peculiarly controversial election issue, a 
particularly popular candidate, or even weather considerations.”165 
Also, a Supreme Court mandate to reapportion according to even 
CVAP would require reliance on a body of data that is far from 
reliable. The Supreme Court has previously lauded census data as the 
most reliable indicator of population.166 On the other hand, citizenship 
 
 157.  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 46. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 5–6. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 8. 
 162.  Id. at 19. 
 163.  See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 93 (1966) (quoting Ellis v. Mayor & City Council 
of Balt., 352 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1965)). 
 164.  Id. at 92–93 (quoting Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D. Vt. 1965)). 
 165.  Id. at 93 (quoting Ellis, 352 F.2d at 130). 
 166.  Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528 (1969). See also Karcher v. Daggett 462 U.S. 
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data was not included on the most recent Federal Census.167 In fact, 
citizenship data is provided by the American Community Survey, a 
90% confidence-level estimation of citizenship based on a sample of 
two million interviews per year.168 While citizenship is indeed a 
permissible population base with which to draw districts, 
extrapolating an additional subpopulation of voting-aged citizens 
surely compounds the existing risks. It follows that a decision to 
abandon the total population formula used almost uniformly by 
states169 in favor of either registered voters or voting-aged citizens 
would itself be an irrational, arbitrary choice. 
CONCLUSION 
Evenwel v. Abbott provides the Supreme Court an opportunity to 
examine a very provocative Equal Protection issue. Unfortunately for 
Evenwel and Pfenniger, there is too much established precedent that 
raises the standards for successful “one-person, one-vote” challenges 
far above the evidence they have provided. History weighs on the side 
of allowing states to choose which populations they wish to use to 
formulate their voting districts. Therefore, proof of questionably 
disparate treatment of two districts in Texas does not warrant the 
dismantling of historically coherent Equal Protection doctrine. 
 
 
725, 738 (1983) (declaring that “the census data provide the only reliable—albeit less than 
perfect—indication of the districts’ ‘real’ relative population levels”). 
 167.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010 (2009), 
https://www.census.gov/2010census/pdf/2010_Questionnaire_Info.pdf. 
 168.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USING 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT GENERAL DATA USERS NEED TO KNOW 10 
(Oct. 2008), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2009/acs/ 
ACSAIANHandbook.pdf. 
 169.  See Fishkin, supra note 137, at 1890. 
